Case Study: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj Narain (1968) | Exclusion of Time

The 'Case Study: State of U.P. v. Maharaj Narain (1968)' is a classic case dealing with the Limitation Act of 1908 where the court interpreted the term “time requisite” under Section 12(2) of the Act and also dealt with the exclusion of time as provided in the provision.

Case Title: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj Narain

Court: Supreme Court of India

Citations: AIR 1968 SC 960

Judges: Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice K.S. Hegde

Date of Judgment: January 30, 1968

Facts

• The respondents were tried for several offences before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad and were acquitted.
• The state appealed in the Allahabad High Court against this order.
• The High Court dismissed the appeal because it was barred by limitation.
• Therefore, the State has filed an appeal to the apex court for it to decide on this issue.
• As per the Limitation Act, the limitation period for an appeal against an acquittal order is 3 months.
• The order against which the appeal was filed was delivered on November 10, 1962.
• As per the appeal order, the application to obtain the copy of the acquittal order was November 15, 1962, which was ready on January 3, 1963.
• The appeal memo (memorandum) was filed on March 29, 1963.

Issues

• What is the true scope of “time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from” under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908?
• Whether in the calculation of the period of limitation for an appeal, the time taken to obtain the copy filed along with the appeal memo or the time taken to obtain the earliest copy available, should be considered.

Laws Applied

Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides for the exclusion of time in legal proceedings.

Arguments Before Court

The respondents contended that the appeal was time-barred since the appellant had obtained 2 other copies of the order on December 20 and 21, 1962, which were made available earlier than the copy filed with the appeal. Therefore, the period of limitation should be calculated based on those earlier available copies, rendering the appeal out time. This contention was accepted by the Allahabad High Court.

The respondents did not contest the appellant’s contention that he was not obligated to apply for a copy of the order promptly and could have delayed applying for the copy until the last day of the 90 days of limitation. Even in that case, the time taken to obtain the copy would have been excluded in calculating the limitation period.

Judgment

In this case, the court decided on the true scope of “time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from” as stated in sub-section 2 of Section 12 of the 1908 Act. The court noted that the term “time requisite” in the provision cannot be interpreted as the exact time essential for acquiring a copy of the order. The expression means the time taken to obtain the copy filed and the appeal memo. It does not mean the minimum possible time to obtain a copy of the order. The provision does not require the appellant to apply for a copy promptly or restrict deduction to the shortest time possible for securing a copy. The provision enlarges the period of limitation in the appellant’s favour by excluding the time beyond its control in getting the copy produced in appeal, without limiting the scope and purpose of such exclusion.

Therefore, the court held that the High Court’s interpretation of the law was erroneous. However, it refrained from intervening in the acquittal order as the instant appeal mainly sought to determine the legal issue in question here regarding the law of limitation. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed on merits but the High Court’s interpretation of Section 12(2) of the 1908 Act was held to be incorrect.